Formas híbridas no SAG do leite no estado do Paraná

Abstract

Restructuring in the 1990s has triggered the milk agro-industrial system in Brazil towards new pathways. Institutional changes modified the production and economic rhythm of the activity within macro and micro-economic spheres, remodeled economic arrangements, segment operations and the profile of its agents. Current study researches the contours of the new context and seeks to understand how hybrid forms occur within the relationship involving producers, whether specialized or not, and the processor of the milk agro-industrial system in the state of Paraná, Brazil. The theoretical bases of the Institutional New Economy, Economy of Transaction Costs and the Economy of Measurement Costs were employed so that our objective may be attained and arguments may be developed. Current qualitative, descriptive and inductive study, featuring a transversal cross-section, comprises the retrieval of primary data from field research in the state of Paraná, coupled to half-structured interviews. Secondary data were obtained from documentary and bibliographic research. The Content Analysis method was employed for the analysis and interpretation of data which were systematized in pre-determined categories of analysis and interpreted according to the above-mentioned aims. Current analysis brought about the formal and informal ruling of the institutional milieu, the distinction of technification categories of producers that work within the system and the analysis of governance structures that coordinate milk transactions, especially hybrid forms which is common in producer-purchaser relationships. The heterogeneity of producers, price fluctuations, adequacy to quality norms and market pressure have repercussions on the different arrangements with great efforts to maximize transaction values, reduce costs and protect legal and economic rights. Further, the relationships between producers and purchasers who triggered the transactions of prime matter were discussed. They were mainly materialized by informal agreements (tacit commercial contracts) warranted by quality rules (IN 62) and informal price restrictions (Conseleite) originating from the institutions concerned. Hybrid forms were treated in an innovating manner. They were classified by producers´ technification category and agreement type. Different perspectives of efficiency in transaction were identified in this case. Research revealed that variations in governance hybrid structures are justified sometimes by the size of assets and sometimes by frequency or asset specificities (locational and temporal); in some cases only through reliability and reputation, established by the relationship´s dependence and bi-laterality. Efficiency may be attributed to formal agreements which warrant the protection of legal property rights, minimize transaction costs and maximize the value of commercialized asserts. On the other hand, research demonstrated that there are efficiency gaps in hybrid management due to informal agreement and factors that originated them. When gaps, such as lack of any guarantee in legal and economic rights, insertion of other dimensions not included in the transaction), are acknowledged and coped with, they may minimize the asymmetry of information between inter-relating agents. They may also be refurbished by public policies or by institutionalized standards in their own institutional milieu with possible reduction in the transaction costs.